Interest Groups and Social Movements

Groups shown are: United Auto Workers (UAW); National Rifle Association (NRA); National Education Association (NEA); and American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)

Interest groups are organizations that works towards a collective goal, usually influencing public policy, or the legislative and executive actions taken by the government on a variety of issues. Examples of interest groups are: the AFL-CIO representing many labor unions, like the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), https://www.afge.org, and various other unions; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce represents business interests, roughly speaking these organizations represent labor and capital, respectively. Other groups are organized to promote certain issues, with overlapping economic priorities, ranging from: the NRA, NEA, or even the NAACP, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, co-founded by W.E.B. DuBois, Ida B. Wells, and others, in 1909. These groups are formal organizations seeking to influence policy through political channels, using methods I will list below. The U.S. has so many interest groups, of differing size and agenda, the true number of interest groups are unknown. A few interest groups seem to have a disproportional influence over the government, to put it mildly, or in Sheldon Wolin's view, have grown so powerful they make up a corporate-state which creates inverted totalitarianism, where economics dominates politics; instead of, politics over economics in the Nazi regime or Soviet Union, thus inverted, or upside down.

The most well-known groups, like the ones mentioned above, are highly organized and well-funded, including unions like the UAW, which are big enough to represent themselves on the national level. The current debate over gun reform speaks to this, as do other issues like taxes, corporate subsidies, and tariffs. In short, interest groups seek to gain leverage over members of Congress, basically by threatening to get them voted out of office, either the implied threat, or an actual threat, if they do not vote their way. Groups like the NAACP have less influence over the federal government as a whole than the NRA, but among African-American members of Congress, or in city governments with a large African American population, they may have a great amount of influence over their representatives, which is generally a good thing for democracy. Within regulatory agencies, part of the executive branch, they are able to "capture" these agencies through appointments, a good example would be the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), charged with monitoring Wall St. transactions or the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which is now working to kill "net neutrality," headed by a former lawyer for Verizon. 

The "Iron Triangle"

Finally, well financed interest groups are well known for the use of litigation to overturn unfavorable laws, but go as far as influencing the appointment of judges, not unlike what Al Capone used to do in the state of Illinois. As a result, corporate interests often win out over the majority in democratic politics. The reason for this is the ability to organize, and in the current US system, the ability to make endless legal campaign donations. We will focus on the federal government, but obviously these practices go on at the state and local level, where politicians are purchased for a few hundred dollars in donations. Important Supreme Court cases opened the way for this like Buckley v. Valeo in 1976, and Citizens United v. FEC in 2010. Part of the decision to open up campaign donations in 1976, as David Harvey mentions, is the perception that "democracy had gone too far" on the part of political elites, or the increased demand for "social rights" following the granting of "political rights" in 1965. Despite Madison and Hamilton's attempts to divide the power of the government, the reality is well organized and funded groups are able, with the right amount of money, to breach these barriers with relative ease.

In fact, Madison's theory, known as "pluralism" is still the basis of political science, as shown in the article "The Two Faces of Power." The authors side against the "power elite" theory given by C. Wright Mills, and endorse Robert Dahl's idea of pluralism, which is really just a modern updating of Madison with the same basic idea: how do you control the effects of factions? Madison says a large republic will multiply the amount of factions to the point they all essentially check and balance each other, the idea of overlapping membership is important too, being part of more than one group, Dahl says the same, but does this really occur? Below is a picture of President Eisenhower's Cabinet around the time Dahl's book Who Rules? and "Two Faces of Power" were published (late 1950s-early 1960s):

Eisenhower Cabinet

What the picture illustrates is that pluralism may exist in limited circumstances, a criticism that can be leveled at Madison and Hamilton as well, but what about under more complex circumstances? Is it more likely for elites to monopolize the power of government? Dahl's theory may be more influential in the academy, but Mills has the distinction of influencing history, as many of the "new left" movements of the late 1960s were influenced by his ideas (Sheldon Wolin being the modern equivalent of Mills, sadly also passed away). What is strange about Mills and Wolin is they both refuse the Marxist label, insisting they represent a non-Marxist radical alternative, although many others, including those on the right-wing of politics would see them as Marxists, given their criticisms of capitalism. Mills' power elite does not sound that different from Marx, saying the executive of the state is a committee for managing the affairs of the ruling class. Given the treatment of Marxists in the U.S. in the early 20th century, and the intense ideology of the Cold War, it is understandable why they refuse this label.

The tendency for elitism to develop in politics is very strong. After all, it is Plato who argued for the philosopher-kings to rule over the ancient polis, or city-state, in The Republic. Today's meritocratic elites, highly educated and motivated, are in many ways their modern descendants. The journalist and historian Thomas Frank, author of the best seller What's the Matter with Kansas? (2004) has written on this topic, in his new book Listen, Liberal (2016) as seen in this interview: https://www.youtube.com/watch? That Plato is associated with totalitarian politics, provides an interesting, if disturbing, parallel to today's politics. The early 20th century sociologist, Robert Michels, developed the theory of the "iron law of oligarchy" (oligarchy being a Greek word meaning "rule by the few"). The "law" states, as organizations grow, and become more complex, control of the organization is placed in the hands of those who have superior technical and organizational skills.

In the 1960s, economist Mancur Olson Jr. developed what he called the "logic of collective action." Collective action refers to combined efforts pursuing goals, obviously, political action is collective actions. Olson argues you can separate "diffuse interests," the majority, from "concentrated interests," minority interests. For example, trade policy is made by interest groups lobbying the government for tariffs on imports from foreign countries. This results in higher prices on these goods. A majority of people might be opposed to this, but since the minority interests are more concentrated, they will work harder to lobby the government. The majority interests are diffuse and not organized. This sharply contrasts with Madison's notion of politics, constitutional government, and checks and balances to reduce the influence of the majority. Is it possible that the U.S. Constitution is overly guarded against the will of the majority? If it is true that minority interests often are better organized than the majority and are able to translate that into political policy, then it is very likely to be true. Dahl, in one of his later books from 2002, makes this very argument: the Constitution is not particularly democratic at all, and features strong barriers against majority will, but also argues there is very little we can do about it at this point.

Related to the idea of diffuse v. concentrated interests is what Olson calls the "free-rider problem." A free rider is someone who benefits from a public service, but contributes nothing to maintaining this benefit. Olson argues it is rational to be a free-rider. If rationality is the ability to figure out what is in your best interest, then Olson argues it is rational to free-ride since you get the benefit without doing any work. This leads to a paradox, if everyone free rides than no one will do the work needed to maintain the benefit, for example a clean public park, or well run schools. How, then, can you solve the free-rider problem? Olson argues four solutions:1) keep the size of the group small enough so people get a feeling of friendship or solidarity, that you do not get in a large organization, this however, will limit the effectiveness of the group; 2) create "selective benefits" that are only given if you participate in the group; 3) use coercion to force people to participate; 4) someone takes it upon themselves to provide the cost of the benefit. This explains the often hierarchical structure of many interest groups, hardly run in democratic fashion, whether they are business associations or unions, or other groups. However some critics argue that Olson and Michels are pessimistic and narrowly focused on individual groups. While it might be true that all organizations degenerate over time even as they grow larger, if you take a step back and look at the larger society there are always more groups forming to replace older organizations, often social movements, which we will discuss, become interest groups over time. Of course this is not an easy process and often there is intense struggle and conflict for newer groups to replace older ones. Still it offers one possible solution for the "iron law of oligarchy," even though it has to be a perpetual process. 

 You also have to consider the different tactics used by groups to influence policy.

1. Most common is lobbying which refers to meeting directly with legislators and trying to influence their decisions on voting for laws. Lobbyists are not missionaries trying to convert people, but looking for people who think the same way on most issues. Political parties provide a political identity that interest groups can use to determine who to approach, helping establish connections between interest groups and candidates. Lobbyists have direct access to key policy-makers in government and is usually reserved for the most influential groups. 
2.  Campaign contributions to finance election campaigns, something every politician is looking for.
3. Economically well-connected groups can use the threat of moving as a way to influence policy, by effectively leaving or exiting the political arena. Sports teams have used this tactic to influence local governments to vote for tax breaks or other concessions.
4. Outside lobbying refers to large groups who write or phone legislators in order to influence their vote. This is seen as more of a "grass-roots" approach to lobbying. 
5. Voting against a candidate. Many groups opposing tax increases on the rich have used this tactic against Republicans in the House of Representatives, making sure they do not vote for tax increases. Those who do not comply are voted out of office, even in the primary, during the next election.
6. Demonstrations and boycotts. This tactic is probably most famous for being used during the early civil movements like the Montgomery Bus Boycott organized by Martin Luther King Jr.
7. Litigation is another tactic used by the civil rights movement as in Brown v. Board of Ed. To litigate means to bring your issue to court in the form of a lawsuit.
8. Forming coalitions or alliances with other groups.
9. Control over information. Many areas for law makers are highly technical (e.g. science and medicine) and depend on interest groups for relevant information.
10. Public information campaigns are directed towards voters to motivate them to lobby legislators. The flow of information is from interest groups to the broader public.
11. Sometimes violence is used even by formally organized groups, (e.g. employers have been known to use violent means to disperse striking workers) but usually this tactic is associated with social movements. 

Before moving on to social movements, there are two main ways to classify interest group politics: pluralist or corporatist

The U.S. system is, again, pluralist. Pluralism refers to large groups acting independently of each other, trying to pursue their own interests. Germany is an example of a corporatist system, with a smaller number of groups: government, business, and labor. In a pluralist system groups like business and labor act as separate, and often antagonistic interests, while in a corporatist system business and labor are brought together in an institutional environment to create cooperation between these groups, characterized by large trade associations with close ties to the government. Economists Peter Hall and David Soskice, in the book Varieties of Capitalism (2001), argue there are six crucial areas that distinguishes a pluralist system (or in their terms a liberal-market economy, LME) from a corporatist system (coordinated market economy, CME).

1. Finance: Businesses in pluralist systems finance their activities through capital markets (banks) and are publicly traded on stock exchanges relative to their "market value." In a corporatist systems, business firms are self-financed in cooperation with other firms in the same industry, or rely on financing from the state.
2. Industrial relations: pluralist systems make business and labor adversaries. Wage contracts are negotiated between business and labor representatives. In a corporatist system wages are decided by institutions representing business and labor, union officials even serve on corporations' board of directors
3. Skill formation: In a pluralist system workers invest in their own skills through education. Employers have little incentive to invest in worker training since workers leave often and find new jobs. Corporatist systems usually have better job training programs, funded by unions and employers, employment at firms is longer.
4. Product markets: In a pluralist system businesses have to compete against each other for a share or a piece of a certain market. Marketing and advertising campaigns are common ways of increasing market share. A corporatist system divides markets between firms, that negotiate for a share of the market
5. Inter-firm relations: In a pluralist system, technology is shared by firms through paid licensing. A corporatist system allows for technology sharing in a more cooperative setting.
6. Firm-employee relations: In a pluralist system corporate managers have much more freedom and power than they do in a corporatist system.

Hall and Soskice argue that in a "liberal-market economy" like the U.S. or a "coordinated market economy" like Germany these six areas will complement and reinforce each other.

Social Movements

Social movements are basically protest groups, like the civil rights movement, or the labor movement, and differ from interest groups mainly by level of organization, although most social movements have some organization, it is usually not as formalized. This has various advantages and disadvantages. Lack of formal organization gives social movements greater flexibility than interest groups, however they often lack the resources of organized interests. We have dealt with many examples of social movements already, there  are also studies of the rise and fall of social movements.

Before the 1970s, not much research had been done on protest groups, and what little had been done generally concluded these groups did better the more they organized. However, Frances Fox Piven, in the book Poor People's Movements (1977), co-authored with Richard Clowhard, provides an enormous amount of historical research showing union leaders limited strikes by workers in the 1930s (and other periods), and movements were more successful, the less organized they were, they call this the theory of "disruptive power." It is interesting to compare this book written in the 70s, detailing struggles in the 30s, to conflicts going on today, like the various teachers' strikes. True to what Piven would predict, the unions, in this case the NEA and American Federation of Teachers (AFT), have inhibited, or undermined the efforts of teachers to go on strike. The most high profile of these strikes, so far, like in West Virginia, have all been coordinated through social media, ignoring or defying the union hierarchy. A more radical move would be to call a general strike of all teachers, not just in states, but throughout the nation.

Flint sit-down strike, 1936

Interest groups might have closer ties to government, but often lack the popular support social movements have. Social movements are not necessarily "good" while interest groups are "bad," although we tend to think of formality negatively and spontaneity as something positive. Social movements can range from anything from the civil rights movement to the rise of fascism in Europe in the 1930s (and now, again). Many social movements use the tactics of non-violent civil disobedience, like bus boycotts, but social movements can use violence as well, like in Charlottesville.

Theorists of social movements like Doug McAdam argue there is a structure for how social movements operate, and must take into account three factors:

1. The political opportunity structure: what are the options for political action given by the political system? An authoritarian government will have a more restricted structure than a democratic government.  Political opportunities are also created outside of national boundaries by global social movements and international organizations
2. Mobilization structure: refers to how the movement is able to generate collective action by mobilizing its supporters. The growth of communication technology and social media has greatly increased the ability to mobilize people.
3. Framing: refers to how the goals of the movement are articulated. Ideology is important as well because a belief system which ties supporters together and gives them a way of framing or interpreting the goals of the movement.

Other theorists like Tilly, argued that social movements follow a similar pattern of rising and failing, based on Michels' iron law of oligarchy, with some variable paths they can go, inevitably leading to decline:

There is a logic to social movements, bringing up the same problems of collective action, namely the free-rider problem. 

Another approach to the logic of collective actions is given by Albert Hirschman, in the book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970), who argues there are three primary responses from a group or individual to a declining institution. Hirschman developed his analysis originally by looking at the responses of consumers to businesses but then argues this model can be used for politics as well. The most common response of a consumer to a product they do not like anymore, is to exit, meaning to take their business elsewhere, but in a political sense this can be done as well, for example sports teams which threaten to leave a city, or even people threatening to leave a country (e.g. various celebrities vowing to move out of the country—of course no one ever leaves). However, the idea of threatening to leave, or exit leads to the second response, voice, to express your discontent with the institution and desire to change or reform it. So when confronted by a situation one does not like, one can either exit the situation, or voice their discontent and try to change the situation. What then determines the influence of voice? There are many factors involved like resources and connections, but also the threat of exit has to be considered as well. Simply put, if I am threatening to leave you but you do not take this threat seriously then you are less likely to give in to my threat, however if you do believe I might actually leave you might be more willing to make concessions. For example, if an employer feels that a union's threat to strike (exit) is credible, it is more likely to give in to demands. Counter-culture groups that refuse to participate in mainstream society is also a kind of "exit" tactic.  Finally, there is loyalty, which means you do nothing and wait for things to change. The level of loyalty influences the threat of exit. If I am loyal, I am less likely to leave. Many people exited the Democratic Party by not voting for Hillary Clinton in 2016 and are criticized for doing so, on the other hand, being loyal lessens the chance that elites will change losing strategies and policies. Hirschman's goal was then to specify in real situations the values of exit, voice, and loyalty, how likely groups would use these responses in situations. Hirschman's logic like Olson's can be used for both interest groups and social movements.

To sum up, the goals of interest groups and social movements can be very similar, as are the problems that limit their effectiveness.The tactics chosen by interest groups and social movements are related to their level of organization and ability to mobilize people. Many social movements, as they become more formalized over time, become more like interest groups (or in some case change into political parties). In many ways, the more successful a social movement, the more it risks losing what makes it effective.